The article explains enhancing RPC Proxy Injection to evade Elastic EDR telemetry by avoiding common API calls like WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread, using custom shellcode delivery via thread descriptions and APCs to hide malicious behavior.
The article “Living off the Process” details a technique to inject and execute shellcode into a remote Windows process by reusing existing RWX memory, ROP gadgets, and threads within that process, avoiding conventional memory allocation and lowering detection footprint.
The article presents EDR-Freeze, a user-mode tool exploiting Windows Error Reporting to suspend EDR and antivirus processes by abusing MiniDumpWriteDump and WerFaultSecure, leaving security agents in a “coma” and creating a blind spot for attacks.
Article demonstrates how lateral movement can still be achieved in a lab with Elastic EDR and Microsoft ASR enabled by modifying payload delivery and execution techniques, bypassing common detection patterns and highlighting gaps in behavior-based defenses.
SafeBreach Labs disclosed a critical RCE in the MS-EVEN RPC service (CVE-2025-29969) that lets low-privilege users write arbitrary files remotely on Windows 11/Server 2025, bypassing share limits. Patched May 2025.
This article explores ALPC in Windows 11 and Windows Server 2025, covering hardened server design, message attributes, section-based transfer, and its role in Local RPC. It also analyzes ALPC as a security boundary and attack surface.
Proof-of-Concept (PoC) for CVE-2026-20817, a local privilege escalation vulnerability in the Windows Error Reporting (WER) service. The vulnerability allows an authenticated low-privileged user to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges by sending specially crafted ALPC messages to the WER service.
Access masks are 32-bit permission values defining what operations a handle or security descriptor allows. The article breaks down standard, specific, and generic rights, explains ACE usage, and shows how Windows enforces access checks internally.
LNK shortcut abuse remains effective because shortcuts are trusted and rarely inspected. The technique enables stealthy execution and strong phishing scenarios. Its future use is likely in initial access and evasion until detection improves.
Windows authentication coercion is still a powerful AD primitive: it forces predictable auth flows and enables relay chains. Modern mitigations reduce easy abuse, but when combined with AD CS o
